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Professor Richard Falk’s body of work has powerfully affected the academic fields of international law and international politics. His impact can
be found in not only academic but also practitioner circles, and just as importantly, in the ways in which the two fields relate. From his early involvement in the World Order Models Project (WOMP) to his more
contemporary work on humane governance and law in world order, numerous themes involving sovereignty emerge, including the role of international law in international politics, and the use of law and activism to
constrain power, particularly as this applies to the disenfranchised populations of the world.
Falk’s public activities have also enhanced the conceptualization of
sovereignty in both soft law norms and legally binding hard law. For example, Falk was a member of the Kosovo Commission Report, and wrote the
key section distinguishing “legality” and “legitimacy.” For the State Sovereignty Commission, which came up with R2P (Responsibility to Protect), a
term of legal art, Falk was a consultant, writing one paper.
When looking at the movements Falk has been a part of, one is struck
by their historical significance, marking the course of the development of
human rights and justice from the past century to today. He has worked
* Dr. Henry F. (Chip) Carey is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Georgia State
University in Atlanta. His most recent of a dozen authored or edited books is Peacebuilding
Paradigms: The Impact of Theoretical Diversity on Sustainable Peace (Cambridge University
Press, 2020). He is co-editor of the forthcoming The Scholarship of Richard A. Falk (Routledge).
He is also editor of United Nations Law Reports and the Journal of International Organization
Studies.
** Dr. Stacey M. Mitchell is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State
University, Perimeter College. She specializes and is published in the areas of international criminal law, transitional justice regimes, democratization and political violence, and the Rwandan and
Armenian genocides and mass atrocities.
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tirelessly for justice around the world, including in Kosovo, Iraq, and the
United States. Many of the judicial bodies he has been a part of are peoples’
tribunals, including the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in the Philippines
(1980); the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in Paris, France, which addressed
the Armenian genocide (1984); and the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in
Brussels, Belgium, in a 1984 case pertaining to US involvement in the war
in Nicaragua.1 Falk provided expert testimony in a number of cases involving such issues as free speech, the right to conscientious objection, and the
right to protest.2 He also is a member of numerous boards and advisory
councils whose objectives are to advocate for policies to protect the rights
of the disenfranchised and the well-being of humanity as a whole.3
Still active at the age of ninety, Richard Falk can be appreciated for his
public impacts, his social science conceptualizations, and his legal methods
integrated in an interdisciplinary style. Falk’s work has applied evolving
theoretical frames, which have nonetheless remained grounded in broad
commitments to world order and governance, and the place of law within
them. His work examines contemporary challenges across the decades,
from law and the use of force in the Vietnam War and in both US engagements in Iraq, to activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, accountability for serious crimes, and global environmental law and politics.4 His
most recent work, in which he examines various peacebuilding paradigms,
emphasizes the importance of local perspective and agency in peacebuilding projects, demonstrating a constant theme to which Falk frequently returns, that of inclusion of all voices in the struggle for a better world.5
In considering the breadth and depth of Falk’s work, one is continually
struck by a prevailing sense of urgency, and at the same time a sense of
frustration with the “one step forward, three steps back” pattern of global
legal development. It becomes relatively easy to adopt a cynical perspective
about humanity’s ability to progress, despite its efforts, and in many examples its triumphs, over adversity on a global scale. One could look to the
progress of the International Criminal Court, or even more broadly, any
1. Richard A. Falk, Curriculum Vitae (Nov. 2012), https://princeton.academia.edu/Richard
Falk/CurriculumVitae. Falk has also sat on the jury panel for a number of other peoples’ tribunals,
including for the London Nuclear Warfare Tribunal in 1989 and the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal
in Paris, France, in 1991 in relation to a case concerning the Amazon and indigenous rights.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Many of these books are included in this article. However, other contributions by Richard
A. Falk on these topics include REFRAMING THE INTERNATIONAL: LAW, CULTURE, POLITICS (Richard A. Falk, R.B.J. Walker & Lester Edwin J. Ruiz eds., 2002); POSTMODERN POLITICS FOR A
PLANET IN CRISIS: POLICY, PROCESS, AND PRESIDENTIAL VISION (David Ray Griffin & Richard A.
Falk eds., 1993); and CRIMES OF WAR: IRAQ (Richard A. Falk, Irene Gendzier & Robert J. Lifton
eds., 2006).
5. Richard A. Falk, A Pluralist Cosmopolitanism for the Twenty-First Century, in
PEACEBUILDING PARADIGMS: THE IMPACT OF THEORETICAL DIVERSITY ON IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE PEACE 147, 147–59 (Henry F. Carey ed., 2020).

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST308.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 3

12-NOV-21

RICHARD FALK’S COSMOPOLITAN VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY

15:21

709

courts that apply universal jurisdiction for jus cogens offenses, such as genocide or crimes against humanity. Substantial progress has also been made
in the expansion and protection of human rights and in a greater reliance on
the use of soft power rather than force as a means of conflict resolution.
The complex influences of his childhood, especially his estranged parents and their families’ conservative views, were formative. Having a
mother who was a champion tennis player was important, even if I am not
sure how. Other than that, Falk gained all the benefits of athletics, including
his remarkable endurance and discipline in academic and public pursuits.
The distance from his parents allowed Falk to distance himself from their
political views, while retaining his father’s love of writing and interests in
public affairs, even if they were on the side of what he has opposed. In his
recently published memoir, Public Intellectual,6 he portrays his childhood
realities, which explain Falk’s “peculiar” later development, especially his
standing apart from those who had similar class, ethnic, and educational
background in the 1940s and 1950s. He also kept his distance from his
mentors at Yale Law School, Myres MacDougal and Harold Lasswell. Despite Yale’s ostensible commitment to “World Order” values, Falk’s difference with this “New Haven School” was about not only MacDougal and
Lasswell’s deference to “effective power” but their belief that the US was
using power to achieve their preferred future, which was essentially free
market constitutionalism, what later became known as the “Washington
consensus.”7
Yet, Falk’s own words decry a sense of optimism to some extent. In
his poem “‘Humanity’ and Humanity,” he states:
We are told over and over that humanity
is truly love and goodness
is blessed with soul and spirit
That evil is nothing but ignorance wayward motion.
When a new moon rises as if a child of the sky
and birds serenade the dawn
and high waves beat against the shore
I glow with pride for humanity
But then the wind comes from no where
coloring the sky with black clouds
And I shudder with fear if I hear that word.8
Falk stresses time and again in his writing and edited volumes the unintended consequences, and sometimes intended consequences, of globaliza6. RICHARD A. FALK, PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL: THE LIFE OF A CITIZEN PILGRIM 7–52 (2021).
7. Kevin B. Grier & Robin M. Grier, The Washington Consensus Works: Causal Effects of
Reform, 1970–2015, 49 J. OF COMPAR. ECON. 59, 59–72 (2021).
8. RICHARD A. FALK, WAITING FOR RAINBOWS 128–29 (2015). On a personal note, author
Carey’s late father, John, was active in Falk’s early Princeton career as part of an academic circle,
which indicates an openness to public activism. Both of them also have appreciated and written
haiku poetry.
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tion, which are grave and are mounting “black clouds” on the horizon.
Whether these be the threats posed by climate change, the spread of the
internet and global technology, poor environmental policies,9 vast inequities
in wealth and resources, global pandemics, conflicts for profit, or probably
the most troubling, complacency on the parts of member states of the global
community, they reflect the entrenched interests of stakeholders in the
Westphalian system and the neoliberal economic model.
While not minimizing the dangers that could attend a transition to a
world governed by law, Falk argues that we are currently facing a “Grotian
moment,” which is a term he popularized in his 1998 book, Law in an
Emerging Global Village: A Post-Westphalian Perspective.10 Law in an
Emerging Global Village represented the culmination of decades of efforts
from the WOMP to establish a just and sustainable world order, not balanced by force of arms, but by shared norms of empathy, human worth, and
dignity. Falk’s efforts to shift the perceptions of policymakers, scholars, and
the wider public from the deeply engrained statist norms of the Westphalian
order to those of a more humane cosmopolitan legal order have been a
lifelong quest.
In The Future of the International Legal Order Volume II (1970), Falk
and Black suggest that the mounting threats faced by the world reflect a
“paradox of aggregation,” in which states shirk their responsibilities to
properly maintain public goods like the ocean and the atmosphere.11 This
paradox is a problem that cannot be left to multinational corporations to
handle effectively. As history and the current state of affairs have shown,
these corporations’ ability to step in and act responsibly is contingent on
their being “brought within some framework of control that is expressive of
general community interests.”12
At the risk of oversimplifying a complex public life (to say little about
his formal professional academic career), Richard Falk’s work as a public
intellectual can be divided into five major themes, along with multitudinous
9. For some of Falk’s earlier work on the global environment, see RICHARD A. FALK, THIS
ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL (1971).
10. RICHARD A. FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998).
11. Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black, Introduction to THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER, VOL. II: WEALTH AND RESOURCES vii, viii (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black eds.,
1970).
12. Id. at ix. However, whether this cosmopolitan quality has been achieved, or more correctly, is in the process of being achieved, depends on the author’s focus of study and which area
of law is applicable. While some, such as Wolfgang Friedmann, suggest that the creation of institutions and trade regimes designed for promoting human welfare evidences a turn toward the more
cosmopolitan, other contributors, including William T. Burke and Burns H. Weston (who write
about the law of the sea and the processes surrounding foreign wealth deprivations, respectively),
suggest that one cannot discount the power of the economic self-interests of states. This observation applies equally to Ivan A. Vlasic’s piece on the law of outer space. In fact, all of the contributions to Volume II demonstrate the lasting legacy of geopolitical interests as a constraint to global
cooperation regarding redistribution.
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minor ones. All of them, in a sense, “came to him” in the course of events
and trends, and in Hegelian fashion, created a Hegelian dialectic of interacting ideas that synthesized into an architecture for advocacy. Unlike some
critics’, Falk’s normative vision was always a partner with his condemnation of systematic and largely ignored injustices that have been perpetrated
by a world characterized by willful and plain blindness.
This essay examines Richard Falk’s major theoretical approaches and
their contributions to the fields of international law and politics, assessing
some of his major works dealing with the use of force and accountability
for serious international crimes. After a discussion of his work advocating
for the end of the Vietnam War and his involvement in the World Peace
through Law Movement, we assess his contributions to ending the spread of
nuclear weapons. We then focus on Falk’s emphasis on the complementarity between civilizations (an “anti-clash-of-civilizations” argument). The
discussion then turns to Falk’s focus on the pressing need of alleviating
climate change, and lastly, to Falk’s controversial tenure as UN (Human
Rights Council) special rapporteur for Palestine, during which he challenged the preferred framework applied to Israeli-Palestinian relations. In
all five of these areas, international law, his academic specialty, has informed Falk’s work, especially in international humanitarian law, human
rights law, and procedurally, the rules of the UN Charter. Falk has brought
his expertise to his public life of prodigious essay writing in opinion journals and newspapers, panel discussions and speeches, rallies, international
fact-finding missions, an enormous and generous correspondence, and even
poetry.
VIETNAM AND THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD
ORDER
During and after the Vietnam War, Falk edited a four-volume series,
The Vietnam War and International Law, and coedited Crimes of War.13 In
the former series of books, Falk and his contributors examine various facets
of the international legality of the war, ranging from the legality of foreign
intervention in Vietnam’s civil war to the legality of the use of force to
contain the spread of the civil war into neighboring countries (like Cambodia) to the use of chemical weaponry and cluster bombs to the treatment of
prisoners of war.14 These themes also find a place in a more recent book of
Falk’s, Revisiting the Vietnam War (2017).15
Falk’s views on the Vietnam War, as an example of the failure of the
Westphalian system, are a matter of record. As a matter of practice, Falk
13. 1–4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard A. Falk ed., 1968, 1969,
1972, 1976); CRIMES OF WAR (Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko & Robert J. Lifton eds., 1971).
14. THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13.
15. See generally REVISITING VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: VIEWS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF RICHARD FALK (Stefan Andersson ed., 2017).
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also represented clients who expressed views about the war that were contrary to the government’s position and policy, either in expert testimony in
courts or in the court of public opinion. In his testimony on behalf of a
conscientious objector, Falk argued of the necessity to absolve those who
break laws that are not just immoral but illegal to obey—an argument
which was based on the duty not to obey illegal orders as established by the
Nuremberg principles.16
The abuse of power and prerogative of the two US administrations
involved in the conflict contributed to a humanitarian crisis that spread from
Vietnam and engulfed other parts of the region. In his critique of the prospects for peace as a consequence of the Paris Agreement, Falk suggests the
Nixon administration’s attempt to occupy a “middle ground,” in its support
of the administration of Nguyen Van Thieu and its ignoring of the human
rights abuses and mismanagement of the Thieu government (1965–1975),
was likely to reignite US intervention in the conflict and impending crisis
between the two Vietnams, North and South. On this point, Falk stated,
[W]e have neither peace nor justice nor honor. We are still entangled inappropriately and ineffectually in the destinies of South
Vietnam. And we still have a country that is deeply divided. A
fair portion of America regards the government in Washington as
lacking in sensitivity toward the claims of its citizens to have positions based on their conception of honor as associated with
scruples about supporting America’s involvement in the war.17
In his later work, Falk laments the fact that whatever lessons were to
come from US involvement in the Vietnam War did not stick, evidenced by
US engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the twenty-first century. Falk categorizes this engagement as a failure to recognize the “virtual
impossibility . . . of turning military superiority on the battlefield enjoyed
by the intervening side into a favorable political outcome against an adversary that occupies the commanding heights of national selfdetermination.”18
The importance of peace and what is required to achieve peace is a
recurring theme through much of Falk’s early work. For example, his involvement in the World Peace through Law Movement of the late 1950s
embodied his commitment to a greater role of international and regional
institutions in achieving peace. Following a series of conferences, the
movement reached three major conclusions, all about what would need to
take place for world peace to be achievable:
16. See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 905 (D. Mass. 1969).
17. Richard A. Falk, The Justness of the Peace: Remarks by Richard Falk, 67 AM. J. INT’L L.
258, 262–63 (1973).
18. Richard A. Falk, The Afghanistan War in the Mirror of the Tet Offensive: When ‘Defeat’
Became ‘Victory,’ FOREIGN POL’Y J. (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/
2011/08/15/the-afghanistan-war-in-the-mirror-of-the-tet-offensive-when-defeat-became-victory.
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(1) international law-making [be] modernized and speeded up; (2)
international decision-making [be] improved by creating new regional or specialized courts, as well as by better use of existing
decision-making institutions; and (3) the legal profession of the
world [mount] a collective and sustained program to further these
goals which, when achieved, will make law a credible substitute
for the use of force.19
One of the criticisms offered of the movement was of the idea that
achieving peace did not necessitate the use of “‘diplomatic maneuvering’
within the context of the present system of international relations.”20 In The
Future of the International Legal Order, Volume I (1969), Falk acknowledges that the politics of power endemic to this system of international relations has also dominated the international legal order, for decades in the
case of the neoliberal model, and for centuries in the case of the Westphalian system of sovereign states.21
In some of his earliest work, Falk distinguishes between two competing logics of the international system: the Westphalian decentralized system
of equally sovereign states created in the seventeenth century, and its alternative, the Charter system, based in institutions of the UN as an ordering
principle, centered on the United Nations Charter (1945).22 He offers a
strong argument that the Westphalian system, with its emphasis on sovereign states as the primary movers, and interstate cooperation based on rational consent as the foundation of international law, increasingly fails to
meet global challenges, including those associated with conflict, inequality,
environmental degradation, and so on.23 The Charter ordering logic, in
comparison, holds greater promise, although the “tensions,” as Falk refers
to them, arising from various institutional features of the UN that perpetuate
aspects of the Westphalian logic impede the institution’s ability to achieve
19. Charles Rhyne, Notes and Comments, World Peace Through Law Conferences, 56 AM. J.
INT’L L. 1001, 1001 (1962).
20. David Lehmen, Book Review, 19 LA. L. REV. 238, 239 (1958) (reviewing G. CLARK &
L.B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW (1958)).
21. Falk defines the “International Legal Order” as one that “is conceived of as an aggregate
conception embodying those structures and processes by which authority is created, applied, and
transformed in international society.” Richard A. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter
Conceptions of International Legal Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER,
VOL. I: TRENDS AND PATTERNS 32, 33 (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black eds., 1969).
22. Id. He also considers alternative logics, or in other words, the influences of “spheres of
influence,” what he refers to as “rules of the game,” and lastly, “decentralized modes of international authority,” in other words, states that implement international law in their domestic systems.
Id. As examples of the latter, he refers to state prosecutions for crimes under universal jurisdiction
(e.g., piracy, war crimes, and so forth). See id. at 64–69. It is somewhat difficult to discern the
actual differences between some of these alternative orders (“spheres of influence” and the Westphalian system, for example), and admittedly, the use of piracy as an example of universal jurisdiction faces certain problems. Despite universal jurisdiction, few prosecutions for piracy have
taken place; most states rely on a “capture and release” policy.
23. Id. at 55.
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its goals of peaceful conflict resolution, economic equality, the promotion
and protection of human rights, and so forth.24
There is a distinction to be made between what Falk terms the “pessimistic Westphalian” perspective and the “optimistic Westphalian” perspective.25 Adherents of the former “believe that an essentially statist structure
is incapable of solving the crisis of global governance.”26 Adherents of the
latter are “confident that the problem-solving potential and world order
adaptability of Westphalian logic can meet the challenge, and that structural
modifications of world order are not needed.”27 Many policymakers in
Washington, DC, fall into the latter camp and shrink from arguments (and
indeed empirical evidence) that demonstrate the “post-Westphalian” trend
that is actually taking place.28 Instead, they advocate the US taking a lead in
ensuring greater stability and well-being (a “display of wishful thinking”).29
Those considered “post-Westphalian,” on the other hand, suggest that
“heavy emphasis [should be placed] on global and regional law superseding
international law” as a means to combat the downsides of globalization.30
All of Falk’s work—academic, policy, popular—reflects a “post-Westphalian optimist” stance, although it is fair to say that Falk is more of a
pragmatic optimist, in that he acknowledges the complex concerns facing us
all, while at the same time having hope that a will for a greater common
good is obtainable.31 Falk’s cosmopolitan argument, as an alternative to the
mainstays of international relations, realism, liberalism, and constructivism,
arguably grants greater agency to those—institutions of civil society and
individuals working within domestic and international spheres—whose
work is gradually making a difference in addressing these concerns; that is,
those who have “the vision and capability to produce change without inducing chaos and catastrophe.”32
In On Humane Governance (1995), Falk classifies the global system as
“inhumane.”33 He bases this assertion on five measurable indicators: wealth
inequality, prevalence of war, environmental degradation, a “failure to
24. Id. at 64.
25. Richard A. Falk, International Law and the Future, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 727, 728
(2006).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 730.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 728.
31. Falk, supra note 25, at 732–33. You also have “post-Westphalian pessimists,” who contend that moving beyond the statist system will engender chaos and/or the necessity of hegemonic
(read: US) control.
32. Id. at 734. To be fair, constructivists like Kathryn Sikkink, Thomas Risse, and others
refer to the necessary work of “norm entrepreneurs” in effecting change. See, e.g., THE POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C.
Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).
33. RICHARD A. FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL POLITICS 1
(1995).
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achieve a dramatic growth of transnational democracy,” and a failure to
grant full protections to the more vulnerable societies on the planet.34 Many
of these are lingering problems resulting from the manner in which institutions of global governance—that is, those created by the UN—were set
up.35 Case in point: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The
fact that the human rights regime established after WWII was created in
such a manner as to grant states certain “opt out” provisions laid the foundations for the current system of human rights regulation. It is a system that
is fraught with never-ending frictions between state interests, particularly
those of the more powerful states that fail to adequately ensure protection of
their own populations’ human rights, let alone global human rights, and a
cosmopolitan ideal of human dignity and “learning to live together well.”36
What Falk and other scholars working on the WOMP advocated was a
global order
created by a combination of social forces acting effectively and
on behalf of such world order values as nonviolence, economic
and social justice, human rights and democracy, and environmental quality. . . . It is informed by a desire to improve the human
condition by direct political action, deploying means that reject
violence, respect truth, and rest their confidence upon democracy
as both process and outcome.37
This global order must be a democratic one. So, what does that mean?
Falk describes this order as one that has the potential to achieve what is
necessary for global survival (as he refers to it, “horizons of necessity”), but
in a manner that adheres to a “robust regime of law that is itself responsive
to the values and implementing procedures of a human rights culture and to
demands for global justice.”38 Individuals and nongovernmental organizations (global and national civil society institutions) play an invaluable role
in this order. This latter statement reflects a constant theme throughout
Falk’s work.39 Moreover, this order is one that maintains, or should maintain, “as much decentralism as possible, with as much centralism as neces34. Id. at 1–2.
35. RICHARD A. FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER: AMERICA’S IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS
10 (2004). Falk puts it rather bluntly (and accurately) when he states: “It would be a mistake to
regard the establishment of the League of Nations or, later, the United Nations and the European
Union as indications that the Westphalian statist/geopolitical framework was being superseded by
either design or practice.” Id. Instead, these institutions, “although ambiguous with regard to overall purpose, mainly function as instruments for the attainment of statist objective.” Id.
36. RICHARD A. FALK, ACHIEVING HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2009). The creation of “opt out”
clauses is a criticism that also applies to treaties like the UN Convention on the Punishment and
Prevention of Genocide, with respect to the “obligation” to respond to genocide as per Article VIII
of the treaty.
37. Richard A. Falk, From Geopolitics to Geogovernance: WOMP and Contemporary Political Discourse, 19 ALT.: GLOB., LOC., POL. 145, 146 (1994).
38. FALK, supra note 36, at 16.
39. FALK, supra note 10, at 33–45. See also FALK, supra note 33, at 199–200, 236.
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sary,” by which he means “central guidance and international presence for
regulatory purposes in relation to [a] global interdependence agenda.”40
Falk suggests that, despite their weak points, the institutions of the UN
have been a valuable forum in which relevant actors (really states) can communicate and draw attention to various needs, conflicts, and other global
imbalances and, in so doing, create a discourse that, in turn, will prompt a
normative shift toward an interdependent and interlinked collective.41 This
is not to say, of course, that merely drawing attention to issues, contributing
to a growing discourse, and so forth translate into policy change. As an
example, Falk cites the actions of the countries of the South in the 1970s
and their attempt to create a new international economic order (NIEO). The
South’s efforts to level the economic playing field so to speak with the
industrialized North fell flat (or as Falk so aptly puts it, “the South was
effectively slapped down”).42
In later work, Falk calls for a “global parliament.”43 Extant inadequacies of the UN demonstrate that whatever form this parliament takes, it
must be one in which a broader definition of citizenship is applicable, a
definition that is above and beyond that defined traditionally by territorial
sovereignty or even by supranational institutions such as the EU. In this
global society, we are “citizen pilgrims” looking for a “sustainable, equitable, humane, and peaceable future.”44 This global parliament centers on a
“sense of human solidarity of a global scope, with allowance for plural
identities.”45 Although it is doubtful this goal will be achieved in the near
future, and questions remain as to the form such an institution would take,
Falk suggests that events, including the consequences of recent US military
action in the Middle East, have increased the receptiveness of many to this
idea of a global parliament.46
In The Declining World Order (2004), Falk refers to a “campaign for
global democracy,” which
regards democratic values as pertaining to all domains of life, although adjusted to reflect the particular setting. On the one side of
everyday existence, democratic accountability, procedures of participation, and transparency extend their reach to the domains of
40. FALK, supra note 33, at 36–37.
41. Falk, supra note 21, at 55.
42. FALK, supra note 33, at 27–29.
43. FALK, supra note 36, at 22.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 200.
46. Richard A. Falk, UN Under Siege: Geopolitics in the Time of Trump, GLOBAL JUSTICE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (July 1, 2017), https://richardfalk.org/2017/07/01/un-under-siege-geopoliticsin-the-time-of-trump. Falk does not completely rule the UN out as a potential “global parliament.”
He suggests that the UN is widely perceived as a legitimate organization: “A strong confirmation
of the value of the UN arises from the fact that every government, regardless of ideology or
relative wealth and power, has up to now regarded it as beneficial to become a member and
remain in the UN.” Id.
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gender and workplace relations, but also to the undertakings of
governments themselves. No one is either above or below the
law.47
At present, however, when it comes to military action or some other
necessary multilateral response, spoilers remain and are not going anywhere
for quite some time. Falk frequently refers to the UN Security Council as a
major impediment to effective global response.48 At the same time, even
when more powerful states—such as the US, China, or Russia—refuse to
acknowledge and act on their responsibilities to protect, through the use of
their veto power on the Security Council among other measures, they are
still contributing to this normative shift toward a more cosmopolitan perspective, because they adopt the language of the Charter in their
discourse.49
THE NUCLEAR ORDER
In the past, Falk suggested that change in the international legal order
may occur as a consequence of some major catastrophic event or events. In
his earlier work, the type of catastrophic event worthy and capable of inducing a critical junction or a major shift in the international legal order was
nuclear war.50 As he states on this point, “[o]ver a longer term, an evolutionary erosion of the existing national locus of power and loyalty seem[s]
likely to take place, but such trends are indefinite and their eventual impact
difficult to anticipate.”51 This statement remains as true today as it was back
in 1969. In the present day and age, a global depression brought on by the
COVID-19 pandemic may just be the event that creates the critical juncture
necessary to prompt a greater consensus for a move away from the decentralized Westphalian system to a more cosmopolitan international legal order. It is important to mention that, in referring to the COVID crisis, we do
not suggest that the nuclear threat is off the table, or that the “nuclear genie
47. FALK, supra note 35, at 28.
48. In an interview with the authors of Weapon of the Strong: Conversations on US State
Terrorism, Falk assessed the use of the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security
Council as “inappropriate” and a “remnant of a West-centric world order.” Richard A. Falk: International Law and Human Right, in WEAPON OF THE STRONG: CONVERSATIONS ON US STATE
TERRORISM 47, 50 (Cihan Akson & Jon Bailes eds., 2012).
49. The fact that the veto has been used by P-5 members to evade accountability for various
misdoings (e.g., the United States in the ICJ Nicaragua case) is certainly cause for alarm. Still,
however, Falk suggests that, in the Nicaragua case, the fact that the U.S. admitted to violating
international law demonstrates the “counter-hegemonic” power or influence of international law.
See id. at 51–52.
50. Falk is a longtime critic of the nuclear weapons regime, which he has referred to as
something that defies rationality given its consequences; as he puts it so well, “[T]o adopt a tone
of rationality is to gloss over the quintessentially absurd reality of contemplating the use of apocalyptic weaponry for the sake of the secular state based upon a rushed decision by poorly qualified
politicians and generals.” ROBERT J. LIFTON & RICHARD A. FALK, INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS: THE
POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE AGAINST NUCLEARISM 128 (1982).
51. Falk, supra note 21, at 38.
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[has been] put back in the bottle,” to use Falk’s words.52 Despite efforts to
contain the spread of nuclear weaponry, horizontal proliferation has occurred and is still occurring, with India, Pakistan, North Korea, and soon,
possibly Iran, members of a select and dangerous club.
Of course, this is not a club limited to more powerful states but also
has the potential to include terrorist groups and organizations, like Al
Qaeda or ISIS. In one of his more recent works on this topic, Path to Zero
(2015), Falk calls for a new debate on the threat of nuclear weapons.53 Falk
and his coauthor, David Krieger, fault a weak international legal system for
continuing its soft and somewhat hypocritical stance toward the necessity of
nuclear weapons and their use as a legitimate measure of security, which
Falk maintains stands as a violation of the Nuremberg principles about aggressive war.54 In particular, in discussing a 1996 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice, Falk states that the court “used the fudge
word ‘generally’ before the words ‘be contrary to the rules of international
law’” to create doubts about the illegality of these weapons.55 Although
countries around the world have made greater efforts, through the auspices
of the UN, to ban all nuclear weapons, Falk acknowledges that the fatal
flaw of the Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT) is
the refusal of any of the nine nuclear weapons states to join in the
NBT process even to the legitimating extent of participating in
the negotiating conference with the opportunity to express their
objections and influence the outcome. As well, most of the chief
allies of these states that are part of the global security network of
states relying directly and indirectly on nuclear weaponry also
boycotted the entire process. It is also discouraging to appreciate
that several countries in the past that had lobbied against nuclear
weapons with great passion such as India, Japan, and China were
notably absent, and also opposed the prohibition.56
Moreover, the NBT contains many opt out provisions, which Falk attributes to the treaty’s “state-centric” quality.57 Nuclear weapons remain a
52. Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Proliferation as a World Order Problem, 1 INT’L SEC. 79, 92
(1977). Falk used this phrase not merely in regard to nuclear weaponry, but also nuclear energy as
a viable alternative to fossil fuels.
53. RICHARD A. FALK & DAVID KRIEGER, THE PATH TO ZERO: DIALOGUES ON NUCLEAR
DANGERS (2012).
54. Id. at 125–45.
55. Id. at 128.
56. Richard A. Falk, Challenging Nuclearism: The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Assessed, CPPN
CULTURE OF PEACE NEWS NETWORK BLOG (July 19, 2017), https://cpnn-world.org/new/?p=10058.
57. For example, Article 17 gives parties to the NBT a right of withdrawal. All that state
parties have to do is give notice, accompanied by a statement of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that
have ‘jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.’ The withdrawal will take effect twelve
months after the notice and statement are submitted. There is no procedure in the treaty by which
the contention of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ can be challenged as unreasonable or made in bad
faith. It is an acknowledgement that even for these non-nuclear states, nothing in law or morality
or human wellbeing takes precedence over the exercise of sovereign rights.
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symbol of power and, Falk would agree, a holdover of the Westphalian
system and the continued preeminence given to realist thinking in many
policy-making circles.
Falk considers addressing the risks associated with nuclear weapons to
be a moral imperative. However, there remains the question of whether nuclear war will be a “Grotian moment.” To some extent, Falk suggests that
the incremental changes that have occurred thus far (e.g., greater use of and
reliance on international institutions of justice, trade, and environmental
protection), which fit with Falk’s “erosion of domestic jurisdiction” characteristic of the UN, may over time produce a substantial shift in the legal
order toward a more cosmopolitan one.58 As Falk states with respect to the
WOMP:
[Its] political ethos insists that we can never know enough to
forgo necessary and desirable goals in human affairs as unattainable, and that our actions, however trivial they may appear, may
generate unexpectedly large consequences because they are aspects of an obscure play of force, so that passivity and withdrawal
from the wide field of political action is necessarily
irresponsible.59
Falk wrote the above passage in 1994. Of course, just as it was then,
perhaps even more so now, change is not going to come without resistance.
A certain degree of path dependency is unavoidable. Those with a stake in
the Westphalian order—elites, the wealthy, both—endeavor to hold on to
the institutional status quo of power relations, or at the very least, control
the direction of change once it gathers speed, if it gathers speed. To this
point, Falk suggests that in the present phase of
international life it is hard to envision scenarios that liberate the
more constructive tendencies in these political systems, because
the strength of this developmental capitalism that has become so
deeply . . . unchallenged . . . does create a kind of determinist
outlook that is very distressing, I think, at least for the short term,
and in view of the kinds of challenges climate change and . . . the
retention of nuclear weapons pose.60
In this scenario, Falk argues that “a new cosmopolitan ideology that
would dissipate the hold of the state upon the loyalty of the individual and
substitute new myths and symbols capable of arousing widespread support”
is crucial to move the process forward.61 Again, this is an ideology that is a
consequence of the discourse generated by the interplay of a number of
Id.
58. Falk, supra note 21, at 59–60.
59. Falk, supra note 37, at 148.
60. Richard A. Falk, Honoring Richard Falk’s Scholarship, Roundtable Panel Discussion at
the 54th Annual ISA Convention (Apr. 4, 2013).
61. Falk, supra note 21, at 40.
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factors. These factors include the increased activity of transnational actors
in drawing our attention to global issues of concern, and “the globalization
of business, finance, and popular culture, eroding the capabilities and resolve of the state as problem-solver” when it comes to these problems.62
However, if a change is coming, when will the “Grotian moment” arrive? Presently, state actors remain resistant to moving beyond state-centric
notions of welfare and security to the notion of a global community whose
interests are interlinked. At the turn of the last century, Falk wrote of a
“normative vacuum” created by the collapse of socialist rule in the early
1990s.63 In this vacuum, he said, the “dominating logic of the market in a
world of greatly uneven social, economic, and political conditions and without any built-in, reliable means to ensure that continuing economic growth
does not at some point and in certain respects cause decisive ecological
damage” was imminent.64 Now this damage is here.65 In many instances,
the lack of global will to effectively address these issues of human despair,
even taking into consideration the greater role and voice of civil society in
shaming and exposing government abuses and corruption, calls into question any realistic aspirations of a world order of the sort envisaged by Falk
emerging.
Of course, to be fair, Falk remains clear on his position about the relationship of international law to politics. Although he advocates for an international legal order centered on humanism, he has long opted for an
“intermediate position,”66 one that recognizes that the application of international law is constrained by historical and political factors on the one
hand, as a sort of macrolevel structure, and the behavior of sovereign states
on the other.67 International law is a “quasi-dependent variable,” an institution that simultaneously is influenced by and influences the international
system and the individual state.68 At the same time, it is crucial that in
occupying an intermediate position, international law be inclusive, influ62. FALK, supra note 33, at 35. Falk cites to these factors, which also include a reduction in
the degree of legitimacy accorded to states and institutions for their handling, or mishandling, of
global crises and the “move . . . of transformative political visions toward an ethos of democratization and nonviolence.” Id.
63. FALK, supra note 10, at 24–26.
64. Id. at 26.
65. The recent words of the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, spoken at the Climate
Ambition Summit in December 2020, speak directly to this point: “Carbon dioxide levels are at
record highs. Today, we are 1.2 degrees hotter than before the industrial revolution. If we don’t
change course, we may be headed for a catastrophic temperature rise of more than 3 degrees this
century. Can anybody still deny that we are facing a dramatic emergency?” António Guterres,
Secretary General, U.N., Remarks at the Climate Ambition Summit (Dec. 12, 2020), https://
www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2020-12-12/remarks-the-climate-ambition-summit.
66. Falk, supra note 21, at 35.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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enced not merely by the interests and preferences of the elite, but also by
those of the citizenry.
In the domestic sphere, international law is influenced by the normative structures within states, which are reinforced by extant legal systems in
those states.69 Falk’s earlier work clearly reflects the importance of Cold
War politics in the international legal order, and particularly the role of
domestic states in upholding and shaping that order. In his 1964 book, The
Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964), Falk suggests judicial deference by states is a function of a decentralized system of
rules (and within each state a “continuing primacy of jurisdictional rules for
a social system”), which in turn, is strongly influenced by “distribution of
value, policy, interest, and power in the world,” albeit that which existed at
that time.70 This statement describes the “external” function of judicial deference; the “internal” function, on the other hand, is the process by which
domestic courts refer disputes to the executive for handling through diplomatic and other means. Falk does identify limitations to judicial deference.
First, deference is “inappropriate” in cases in which there is broad consensus internationally on a rule.71 The example that jumps to mind is crimes
against humanity or genocide, wherein a universal mandate to prosecute
exists. Falk uses the example of noneconomic human rights.72
On genocide, Falk admits to using the g-word too loosely in earlier
writing. More recently, he has drawn two sets of distinctions: (1) “genocide” as the crime and “genocidal” as the behavior which, if persisting and
intentional and documented, can morph into the crime of genocide; and (2)
the distinction between moral, political, and legal conceptions of genocide,
with the latter requiring high levels of documentary evidence as to intention
according to the International Court of Justice. The Armenian massacres
were “genocidal” but could not have been “genocide” as the word did not
exist in 1915, much less the crime, which was not invoked even in the
Nuremberg context that was very jurisprudentially correct in its insistence
that allegations of criminality depended upon prior existence of the legal
prohibition, and must never be retroactive.
The second limitation or “qualification” to which Falk refers concerns
judicial independence, or the prerequisite that courts exercise due diligence
in their decision to refer an international dispute to an executive for
resolution.73
69. See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (1964).
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 9–10. As Falk states on this point, “[A] requirement of social consensus is a condition precedent to the validity of any substantive rule of international law unless the rule is derived
from a specific treaty obligation.” Id. at 10.
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id. at 9–11.
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Falk uses the judicial system of the United States as an exemplar to
suggest that some sort of international consensus, really the emergence of a
global community of like-minded states, within a horizontally organized
international system, should be the basis of the system.74 His discussion of
the Sabbatino case, which at the time was awaiting review by the US Supreme Court, expressed a hope that the Court would rule in a manner independent of the foreign policy interests of the executive.75 Instead, the Court
declined to review the case for less than credible reasons.76
Falk’s argument about the role of domestic jurisdictions in international law rejects definitions of legalization that describe the process as an
essentially top-down one, or as Abbott et al. and others suggest, “a form of
institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation.”77 Theirs is an argument that frames legalization as
conducted by rational states that more or less agree to comply depending on
the strength of the obligations involved (with jus cogens rules being the
most binding), the specificity of the laws in question, and the manner with
which violations or questions of the law are dealt.78 Falk’s is more in tune
with constructivist explanations of legalization of international law in domestic settings as being a function of the degree of “fit” with internal values
and extant normative systems.79 At the same time, Falk’s argument presents
legalization as a much more organic process, stemming from domestic jurisdictions that together create a global order.80
At this point in time, the global order is still heavily influenced and
constrained by the behavior of a powerful group of states. Arguably, the
behavior of the US government over the past few years demonstrates a perception of international law as a vertical phenomenon, meeting two particular limitations of the international order: first, international law being
74. Id. at 21–27.
75. FALK, supra note 69, at 77–138.
76. The Court declined to hear the case on the basis that Communist states, and presumably
their allies (“newly independent and underdeveloped states”), have no real problem with confiscating the foreign property of others. The gist of the argument is that there being a lack of general
international consensus on foreign deprivation, there is no real international legal prohibition governing deprivation. See Burns H. Weston, International Law and the Deprivation of Foreign
Wealth: A Framework for Future Inquiry, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER,
VOL. II: WEALTH AND RESOURCES 37 (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black eds., 1970).
77. Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000).
This is the definition widely accepted, although not without criticism, by the contributing authors
to the Summer 2000 edition of International Organization.
78. See, for example, the contributions to that volume by Karen Alter, Frederick M. Abbott
and Beth Simmons. Karen J. Alter, The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy:
Spillover or Backlash?, 54 INT’L ORG. 489 (2000); Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study, 54 INT’L ORG. 519 (2000); and Beth Simmons, The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT’L ORG. 573 (2000).
79. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer
Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743 (2001).
80. This is a suggestion made in many of Falk’s works. See, e.g., RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN
RIGHTS HORIZONS: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (2000).
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“subordinated to general permissive principles of State jurisdiction which
are capable of almost unrestricted extension” and second, cases or behavior
being made to only appear as if they accord with extant international rules
and norms.81
The emergence of a unitary executive in the US—in the form of Donald J. Trump—was a major setback for Falk’s vision of an international
legal order that respects diversity and encourages fairness. At the time of
this writing, it is difficult to fully gauge the harm done to the international
order by the actions taken by the Trump administration that repudiated and
damaged international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the World Health Organization (WHO),82 not to mention international legal regimes, including the Paris Climate Accords, the Iran Agreement,83 and the UN Charter.84 Moreover, the behavior exhibited currently
by other leaders in the world (e.g., Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Min Aung
Hlaing in Myanmar)85 reflects the continued persistence of the realist reliance on “hard power” (albeit a passive-aggressive hard power in some
cases, like that of the US) as a means of addressing policy concerns.
When it comes to the use of force, whether we are talking about wars
in “self-defense” (however self-defense is conceived) or intervention in protracted conflicts like Syria, Yemen, or Kosovo, the problem is a matter of
effectively addressing the uncertainty that surrounds outside intervention in
another country as a means of responding to the target country’s illegal
behavior. Falk refers to himself as “suspicious of intervention as a way of
making things better.”86 What will the unintended consequences of the use
of force in this capacity be? Falk speaks of the moral and political uncertainty that accompanies intervention, an uncertainty wherein knowledge and
responsibility exist in an oftentimes dialectic relationship.87
81. FALK, supra note 69, at 27–29.
82. This, of course, is a direct reference to the Trump administration’s refusal to appoint
judges to the Appellate Board of the WTO, and his administration’s withdrawal of funding for the
WHO. This latter act was intended to punish the WHO for its mishandling of the COVID-19
crisis. See Teo Armus, Trump Threatens to Permanently Cut WHO Funding, Leave Body If
Changes Aren’t Made within 30 Days, WASH. POST (May 19, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/19/who-funding-trump.
83. Although the Iran Agreement was an executive agreement that included the US, Iran, and
a number of other states, it can be included as an international legal regime as its intent—to
monitor Iranian nuclear capabilities—certainly has international consequences.
84. With respect to the UN Charter, we specifically refer to the prohibition on the use of
force as per Article 2(4) which was, at least on its face, violated by the US in the January 2020
targeted assassination of General Qassim Suleimani of Iran in Iraq. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
85. At the time of this writing, the military of Myanmar and its Union Solidarity and Development Party just removed Aung San Suu Kyi from power. The February 1 coup d’état came as a
result of the November 2020 landslide electoral victories of the National League for Democracy,
the party of Aung San Suu Kyi. Myanmar Coup: Aung San Suu Kyi Detained as Military Seizes
Control, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489.
86. Falk, supra note 60. Although suspicious, he does not suggest that this suspicion is “unconditional,” per se.
87. Id.
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COMPLEMENTARITY
The work of international law must be a process in which all can take
part. Whatever form the WOMP, Falk’s largest effort to reconceptualize
sovereignty, was supposed to take during the 1970s–1980s, it clearly must
have been inclusive, not exclusive. It must strive to avoid the “false universalism” of West-centric notions of human rights and governance, or “depicting the particular and partial as if it were synonymous with the
general.”88 Falk admits the concept of the WOMP is essentially based in
“Western, even in US, specificities and preoccupations,”89 but notes that it
strives to overcome and move beyond these to embrace a vision of the
world that is pluralistic to the extent that it “acknowledges significant difference, as well as sameness, in constituting a world order based on procedures and norms explicitly designed to ensure for equitable participation by
each major world civilisation.”90
George Abi-Saab and Falk were in a minority in the regular WOMP
meetings across the globe in the sense they never favored world government in any form; their frequent collaborator and friend, Saul Mendlovitz,
the founding WOMP director, did advocate world government (despite
graduating from the conservative University of Chicago Law School).
Though the WOMP was indeed funded through Mendlovitz’s fundraising to
be a vehicle for the promotion of world government advocacy, Mendlovitz
was the only one among the several dozen principal participants who advocated world government in any form. In practice, there was not much interest in refuting such advocacy. The greatest value of WOMP was the
diversity of non-Western views, including the focus on development by
those from the Global South and on war prevention by those from the
Global North. Falk himself has instead favored a somewhat stronger United
Nations with greater autonomy with respect to the Charter principles and
purposes, and less submission to the will of the P-5, trying to distinguish his
views by speaking of “central guidance” rather than world government. In
that sense, he was closer to Saul Mendlovitz than the other members of the
WOMP team who were high quality, very independent intellectuals. There
was considerable tension at the meetings, but good camaraderie over drinks
and during mealtime. Saul deserves lots of credit for recruiting participants
who did not share his views but were highly regarded within their countries.
This is an assessment that also applies to cosmopolitanism more generally. Although cosmopolitanism has a “long continuous tradition” philosophically, admittedly, it is or has been largely associated with and affected
by Western society, including through the work of Grotius and Kant, among
88.
lam, 18
89.
90.

Richard A. Falk, False Universalism and the Geopolitics of Exclusion: The Case of IsTHIRD WORLD Q. 7, 8 (1997).
Falk, supra note 37, at 148.
Falk, supra note 88, at 9.
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others.91 Yet, Falk suggests in a recent piece that cosmopolitanism’s themes
of humanity and peace make it a worldview that extends beyond geopolitics, and any one religion, or culture.92 It is a “means and an end” that
embraces not merely humankind, but ecological concerns also.93 This is
contrary to other major international relations paradigms referenced above.
Falk also applies this argument to much of the “New Cosmopolitanism” that emerged after the two world wars, which was focused more on
process, on avoiding war, rather than shaping ideals.94 To achieve real substantive change, however, Falk has always insisted cosmopolitanism must
be more than just a sentiment. It must be thought of as a holistic approach
that accepts as a given the essential interconnectedness of life on this planet
and the pressing need for inclusive global solutions to mounting global
problems.95
Again though, entrenched geopolitical statist concerns and the weakness of international regimes stand in the way of any effective “normative
readjustment” to the prevailing notions of human rights, founded as they are
in the principles of dignity, peace, and compassion. This observation applies particularly to those cases of human rights claims that are based on
long-standing grievances on the part of a people, be they indigenous peoples or Islamic peoples or any other disenfranchised peoples.96 We would
also include here African Americans and persons of color in the United
States. With respect to the Islamic world, Falk has always been clear on the
need for its participation and inclusion in international institutions of power
and authority.97 The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing global
“war on terror” were precipitated by the Islamic world’s exclusion, which
still prevails and continues to fuel, among other things, the rise of the Islamic State, Iran’s propensity toward developing nuclear weapons, and the
Israeli government’s expansion of settlements in the West Bank.98
Against the backdrop of Falk’s thesis about the complementarity of
civilizations is the antithesis, Samuel Huntington’s 1992 “clash of civilizations” argument. Falk describes Huntington’s argument as “dangerous and
simplistic, drawing ethnic and religious battle lines that anticipated a new
epoch of cultural wars based on intercivilizational enmity, culminating in
91. Richard A. Falk, Cosmopolitan Paths to Peace, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF
GLOBAL APPROACHES TO PEACE 29, 29–30 (Aigul Kulnazarova & Vesselin Popovski eds., 2019).
92. Id. at 30.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 38–44.
95. Id.
96. One issue in particular that dogs the progress of indigenous peoples’ rights is the perceived threat that an expansion of their authority means for the territorial interests of the larger
state. Falk, supra note 88, at 11.
97. For his full discussion on the substantive bases of these grievances, see id. at 12–19.
98. See Palestinians Tear Gassed in Protests Against Israeli Settlements, AL JAZEERA (May
18, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/palestinians-tear-gassed-protests-israeli-settle
ments-200516080322410.html.
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the slogan ‘the West against the rest.’”99 Falk posits the “clash argument”
as a rejection of the correct, rational views associated with Western (Christian) modernity. More than that even, the argument presupposes a world in
which those societies who defy or challenge the concepts of modernity
(e.g., a secular state, a market economy) cannot help how they act; it is part
of who they are, their very nature. Huntington offers what is essentially a
primordialist argument, rooted in colonial times, wherein European powers
“civilized” the barbarians or natives.100
As Falk suggests, because this thesis existed when the attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred on American soil, this enabled US policymakers
to neatly associate terrorism with religion, although more in practice than in
rhetoric, as the use of torture and the arbitrary arrest and detention of “terrorism” suspects in the months that followed the attacks attest.101 The clash
argument drove a wedge (and still does in many respects) between those
who argue that not all religions are extreme, that there is a place for “religion in humane governance,” and those who find religion, in particular Islam, antithetical to the protection of human rights.102
Falk cites “failure of political imagination” as a source of the inability
of the modern state system, with its emphasis on “economistic secularism,”
to effectively address problems of poverty, inequality, conflict, and so forth,
which continue to require (demand really) a greater public involvement at
the local level and more broadly in civil society associations at the global
level.103 In this sense, the use of religion as a force to galvanize public
action becomes useful, much as it was during the era of the civil rights
movement in the US. Falk argues that the more exclusionary aspects of
religion, highlighted quite often by those seeking power or to maintain
power, detract from the more universalistic character of religion, which encourages inclusivity and tolerance.104
This notion of religion as a means to an end for power seekers highlights a constant theme in Falk’s work about the importance of agency and
enfranchisement for all citizens. When it comes to policy, the idea of
“othering” people because of their religious or even secular views encourages “intolerance and repression.”105 Including religion (the “Religious Pil99. FALK, supra note 35, at 139.
100. Id. at 139–40. Falk traces the roots of the belief that religion has no place in politics to
the Enlightenment era and the rise of the Westphalian system in 1648. Id. at 142–43.
101. Id. at 140.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 151.
104. Falk acknowledges that early on the WOMP did not include for consideration religion as
a factor of importance. However, at the same time, Falk asserts that the WOMP “did acknowledge
that world order values, widely shared on an intercivilizational basis, provided the normative
framing of any successful project to establish, or even to envisage, human global governance.” Id.
at 144–45.
105. FALK, supra note 35, at 141.
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lars of Human Global Governance”) as a basis for social movements may
breach the statist divide that still prevails in global affairs and that allows,
intentionally or not, these unfavorable conditions to persist.106
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Falk’s concept of global democracy would counteract the privileged
status of great powers in formal international institutions by empowering
peoples’ movements that would build global civil society, which is a necessary tool with which to tackle mounting concerns about climate change.
The protection of human dignity, a large part of which entails access to
decent living standards, clean water and air, sustainable food sources, and
so forth, and the culture of peace must come before states’ interests through
a pedagogy of human security that should be taught as a human right. To
build peace, structures of human security must be developed through the
teaching of tolerance and an educational component that opposes the supposed “lessons of history,” which are based on cultures of revenge, war, and
militarism that are so common in the world. As Falk wrote in Human Rights
Horizons,
Hope begins when we have the moral courage and intellectual
energy to transcend what seems possible by considering carefully
what seems necessary and desirable, and then having the daring to
plan for the ‘impossible.’ I think the changing parameters of debate on climate change, facing that ‘inconvenient truth,’ on the
environment, [are] an encouraging sign of an emerging receptivity to an acceptance of constraints on all forms of political behavior for the sake of a humane future.107
Education is needed to help inspire such civil society actions necessary
to protect the world from environmental (or military) Armageddon.
Falk’s publications, conferences, and speaking engagements, which
stretch back decades and relate to his concerns about environmental degradation, have become even more important in light of the present global
environment. From This Endangered Planet (1971) to A Study of Future
Worlds (1975) to more recent works, including (Re)Imagining Humane
Global Governance (2014), Falk has always insisted that these environmental challenges that persist (and have subsequently worsened over time) are
linked with issues of injustice and inequity.108
106. By “Religious Pillars,” Falk suggests those aspects of religion that appreciate the need to
alleviate problems of human suffering, its legitimacy in popular culture, “the unitive feature of
religious consciousness,” and its ability to inspire hope and the ability to engage in nonviolent
forms of struggle among other positive features. Id. at 157. For the complete list, see id. at
155–63.
107. FALK, supra note 36, at 66.
108. See FALK, supra note 9; RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975); RICHARD A. FALK, (RE)IMAGINING HUMANE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014).
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Like all the other risks associated with globalization, environmental
degradation is one that international institutions and their member states
have failed to fully appreciate. Once again, this failure is another holdover
of the old Westphalian logic of world affairs. As Falk puts it, “The Westphalian political reality, having demonstrated an impressive degree of resilience in addressing intra-systemic challenges, shows a lemming-like refusal
to acknowledge, [much] less adapt to systemic crises, even if threatening to
human survival.”109 These are matters that no balance of power or hegemonic state can address. Rather, it is incumbent on people working through
institutions in which they have a greater voice to effectively tackle environmental degradation.
Addressing climate change requires statist actors to set aside their
short-term interests and look at the big picture, which is to say the impact
environmental degradation has on all life on the planet. By shifting the dialogue about global warming to include voices at the local level, a shift in
perspective on the parts of elites may occur and hopefully will. Just as with
all of his other academic endeavors, in the case of environmental degradation, Falk engages in advocacy intended to redress problems.110
Environmental concerns represent a human rights issue to Falk, one
closely linked with nuclear war, human insecurity, and violence:
The notion of human rights is incomplete to the extent that it
fails to encompass those forms of deliberate behavior that produce serious environmental damage. This set of concerns is not an
exotic or marginal category. In an increasingly interdependent
global setting, where elaborate technology is used and where even
higher levels of industrialization are contemplated, environmental
quality is a critical dimension of human dignity that may have a
significant impact on the development, and even survival, of
mankind.111
PALESTINIAN OCCUPATION
Falk’s criticism of Israeli policy and behavior toward the Palestinian
people demonstrates the problems that the preeminence awarded to the intertwined influences of geopolitics and state security interests have for the
strength of the international order. In this situation, behavior that on its face
is illegal under international law becomes reasonable; it “will not be censured and will indeed form a precedent for others similarly situated.”112
Simultaneously, though, the actions of civil society institutions and influen109. Richard A. Falk, A Radical World Order Challenge: Addressing Global Climate Change
and the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 7, Nos. 1–2 GLOBALIZATIONS 137, 138 (Mar.–June 2010).
110. Falk has been a member of a number of commissions and groups concerned with issues
facing the environment. See Falk, supra note 1.
111. RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 167 (1981).
112. FALK, supra note 10, at 202.
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tial states in protest of Israeli policy in Gaza and the West Bank, such as the
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions, or “BDS,” movement launched by the
Palestinian Solidarity Movement against Israeli businesses, exemplify a
trend toward a global system in which international law is an essential part
of the dialogue.113
As Falk maintains, there is a “double standard” at play, which is
clearly exemplified by the response of the international community, and the
global legal order, to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.114 With respect to the
Oslo negotiations conducted by the Clinton administration back in the
1990s, Falk asserts that the concerns of the Palestinians were “brushed
aside as interferences with the peace process or as matters to be resolved by
the negotiations.”115 Rather than adhering to the principles of international
law and being conducted pursuant to global public opinion, the Oslo negotiations prioritized the interests (statist objectives) of Israel and the US over
those of the Palestinians.
What has resulted is a standard that creates “an impression [a norm,
really,] that Israeli violence against Palestinian refugees and others is generally acceptable as an act of war and expression of security policy, while
Palestinian violence is treated as ‘terrorism’ of a character that undermines
whatever political and moral claims may exist to support the Palestinian
struggle.”116 Falk considers the apartheid-like structure of Israeli institutions of authority in the Palestinian territories and in Israel proper to be one
that is bolstered by the West, in particular, the United States, but also institutions of the UN in its application of international law.117 On the one hand,
there is the 2004 ruling of the International Court of Justice that declared as
unlawful Israel’s construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.118 On the other, there are the findings of the Palmer Commission,
created by the secretary-general of the UN, which ruled that Israel’s attack
on the humanitarian flotilla attempting to deliver aid to the Palestinian people in 2010 was a legitimate exercise of its security policy.119 Added to this
is the modification of the Goldstone report by its chief author, Richard
Goldstone, specifically, his retraction of portions of the report accusing
113. See RICHARD A. FALK, PALESTINE’S HORIZON TOWARD A JUST PEACE (2017).
114. FALK, supra note 35, at 130.
115. Id. at 131. In this instance, the “brushing aside” of the concerns of the Palestinians detracted from the legitimacy of the Oslo proceedings, making them appear one-sided.
116. Falk, supra note 88, at 15.
117. See RICHARD A. FALK, PALESTINE: THE LEGITIMACY OF HOPE (2014).
118. Id. at 117–18. See also Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 136 (2004), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/131.
119. FALK, supra note 117, at 121–25. See also Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of
Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, (Sept. 2011), https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/
0/1922B40C9F4575598525790300457132.
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Israel of committing war crimes and his accusations of slander directed at
the Russell Tribunal in South Africa.120
Falk has consistently argued, since the time of Israel’s founding, that
the UN has failed the Palestinians.121 Unlike for many ethnic groups, the
de-colonization process for Palestine did not end in statehood, although
Palestinians were supposedly promised statehood by the UN, after the
United Kingdom abandoned its colonies.122 Falk has never shied away from
criticism for his views. Rather, Falk—like Edward Said, Noam Chomsky,
and Bertrand Russell—has stated that “[w]e are living at a time when a
much more widely engaged citizenry is urgently needed within the academy, citizens dedicated to speaking truth, empathy, and love to power, who
are able to put aside the willful national and class evasions of global common interests.”123
Falk’s advocacy for justice for the Palestinians is exemplified by his
tenure on the UN Human Rights Inquiry Commission for the Palestinian
Territories in 2001 (for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights).
Although Falk by no means campaigned for this job, his effectiveness drew
the intense scrutiny of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and
other pro-Israel human rights nongovernmental organizations, such as the
Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, California.124 His criticisms of
Israeli human rights violations were accurate, but he did not see his role in
this job as being to criticize those Palestinians who used terrorism to resist
Israeli occupation of territories Israel claimed were not owned by anyone
(even though the State of Israel was effectively legalized by a UN resolution that also designated law for a Palestinian state). This apparent double
standard of Falk’s could be considered hypocrisy if one were to argue that
120. FALK, supra note 117, at 160–65. Falk lauded the report in its original form as “breaking
the sound barrier” (paraphrasing here) in its forthrightness and clarity about Israeli violations of
international humanitarian law. As he put it, “[T]he report is an excellent example of an international inquiry mandated by the UN in adhering to the highest standards of liberal legality given the
circumstances of Israeli noncooperation and the overall problems associated with ‘the fog of
war.’” See Richard A. Falk, The Goldstone Report: Ordinary Text, Extraordinary Event, 16
GLOB. GOVERNANCE 173, 180 (Apr.–June 2010). On a separate but related note, the views expressed by the Russell Tribunal held in South Africa in 2011 were that Israeli rule over the Palestinians amounted to apartheid. Goldstone shortly thereafter wrote an op-ed piece for the New York
Times, wherein he characterized the findings of the Russell Tribunal as slander against the state of
Israel. See Richard J. Goldstone, Opinion, Israel and the Apartheid Slander, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/opinion/israel-and-the-apartheid-slander.html.
121. In Palestine’s Horizon, Falk discusses the “deadly dance between Zionism and the UN
[that] has now come full circle,” in that the Zionism once condemned by the UN in the 1970s has
become a tool used by Israel, through its UN membership, to condemn the BDS movement of the
Palestinians. FALK, supra note 113, at 112–13.
122. Id. at 3–4.
123. Richard A. Falk, Edward Said and the Future of Palestine, 34 RARITAN 1, 2 (2015).
124. The Simon Wiesenthal Center ranked Falk as number three on its list of the “ten most
dangerous anti-Semites in the world.” He shared his inclusion on this list with such other notables
as author Alice Walker and Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. FALK,
supra note 113, at 116.
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nonviolent resistance, or violent resistance without terrorism, was a viable
option.
Clearly, on this controversial issue, saying anything will displease opponents, but Falk’s statements from the viewpoint of international law gave
rise to unfounded claims of “conspiracy mongering” because he wrote a
passage on his blog as well as a forward in a book that praised the author
David Ray Griffin for raising questions (but not for providing a conspiracy
theory) about what happened on 9/11.125 Equally troubling, though perhaps
personally worse in exacting an enormous toll, Falk was subjected to the
canard that his political criticism of Israel’s actions (as opposed to its right
to exist) was evidence of anti-Semitism and that Falk is a self-hating
Jew.126 While he was not raised in an Orthodox household, Falk has never
denied his Jewish identity in any way, and that polemic was designed to
delegitimate him the way actual anti-Semites attempt to delegitimate Israel
with false claims, for example, that Zionism is racism.
Falk’s categorization of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship as
“apartheid” in his 2017 report as UN special rapporteur on Occupied Palestine, coauthored by Virginia Tilley and published by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), was roundly criticized.127
And UN Secretary-General António Guterres subsequently rejected the report.128 All this occurred despite the authors’ findings that the conditions in
the Palestinian Authority and for Palestinians in Israel as a whole meet the
legal definition of apartheid as established by the UN Apartheid
Convention.129
CONCLUSION
Falk walks a fine line when it comes to criticizing the current state of
global geopolitics. His calls for greater conversations about issues associated with addressing global injustice (see, for example, his 2002 edited vol125. Colum Lynch, Richard Falk: I’m Not a 911 Conspiracy Theorist, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.
28, 2011), https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/28/richard-falk-im-not-a-911-conspiracy-theorist. In
this article, Falk clearly states that he is concerned that investigations into 9/11 and other events
“must be seen to be[ ] transparent, exhaustive and honest.” Id. See also Natasha Mozgovaya,
Shlomo Shamir & Reuters, Ban Ki-Moon Condemns UN Palestinian Human Rights Official for
Backing 9/11 Slurs, HAARETZ (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/ban-ki-mooncondemns-un-palestinian-human-rights-official-for-backing-9-11-slurs-1.339181.
126. Patrick Lawrence, A Conversation with Richard A. Falk, Part 2: On Israel, Palestine,
and His Work as a UN Special Rapporteur, NATION (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/
article/archive/a-conversation-with-richard-falk-part-2.
127. Richard A. Falk & Virginia Tilley, Israeli Practices towards the Palestinian People and
the Question of Apartheid, U.N. Doc. E/ESCWA/ECRI/2017/1 (2017).
128. UN Chief Rejects Richard Falk’s ESCWA Report Accusing Israel of ‘Apartheid’, UN
WATCH (Mar. 16, 2017), https://unwatch.org/un-chief-rejects-richard-falks-escwa-report-accus
ing-israel-apartheid.
129. Falk & Tilley, supra note 127.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\17-3\UST308.txt

732

unknown

Seq: 26

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

12-NOV-21

15:21

[Vol. 17:3

ume Reframing the International)130 stand in contrast (to some extent) to
his efforts to more directly affect policy, as the reaction to the 2017 report
demonstrates. We say “to some extent” because Falk’s efforts to influence
US foreign policy are really a natural outgrowth of his decades-long effort
to broaden the discourse on injustice and inequality. Yet, as a consequence
of his more general criticisms of US policy, Falk has come to be considered
one of the more “dangerous” professors in the US. In a 2007 piece written
for International Studies Perspectives, he addresses the McCarthy-like atmosphere that prevailed in US academia during the Bush administration
after 9/11, in which professors were denied tenure or suspended for their
vocal criticisms of US military policies in Iraq and elsewhere: “A witch
hunt that focuses on the most visible academic critics of present policy has
the intended effect of generating an overall climate of intimidation within
university settings. It becomes costly to express dissident ideas, and professionally seems imperative, or at least prudent, to shut up.”131 Falk’s concerns for the ability of academics to effectively challenge and debate extant
US policies gather even greater importance in the era of Trump (and his
allies), whose schizophrenic foreign policies posed a grave danger to the
well-being of not only the US but also the entire global system.
Falk’s desire to challenge these powerful actors, really remnants or
holdovers of an outdated Westphalian order, for their intransigent need to
control and maintain a system of inequality and injustice is perhaps his
greatest legacy, not only to academia but also to the world at large.
In a speech given in 2019, Falk lamented “the absence of the kind of
global problem-solving framework that is needed to address the sort of
agenda of problems that face humanity at this stage,” which he attributed to
the vacuum in global leadership that has emerged over the past few years
and created an “extreme version of a state-centric world” based on nationalism.132 To achieve this “problem-solving framework,” we must expand our
notion of who the key actors are and what their purpose is.
In 2017, Falk characterized a world in which “three distinct identities”
had been created,
‘the Geopolitical Person’ who was increasingly dominating world
politics, including the UN, ‘the Davos Person’ who at the World
Economic Forum was mounting strong pressures on all govern130. REFRAMING THE INTERNATIONAL: LAW, CULTURE, POLITICS (Richard A. Falk, R.B.J.
Walker & Lester Edwin J. Ruiz eds., 2002). WOMP as a whole has been criticized for, among
other things, its “utopian” vision for the post-Westphalian world. Much of this criticism Falk
attributes to realists and those wedded to the statist simplicity of the Westphalian geopolitics. For
more on this point, see Falk, supra note 37, at 150–51.
131. See Richard A. Falk, Academic Freedom under Siege, 8 INT’L STUD. PERSPS. 369, 372
(2007).
132. Richard A. Falk, Current Global Crises: Toward a More Humane Global Governance,
Public Lecture at the University of Western Australia, Institute of Advanced Studies (July 11,
2019), https://www.ias.uwa.edu.au/lectures/falk.
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ments to privilege the interests of market forces, essentially banks
and corporations, above that of their own citizens, and ‘the Perugia Person’ who was on the sidelines whispering words to the
grassroots community conveying the needs and aspirations of ordinary people, and by so doing, highlighting problems of poverty,
peace, environment, biodiversity, health, and justice. In one
sense, my analysis is an argument for a concerted public and
grassroots transnational effort to magnify the Perugia whisper until it becomes a stentorian voice that is heard and heeded within
the halls and conference rooms of the UN in Geneva and New
York.133
We must adopt a “moral epistemology that is overtly value oriented
and normatively ambitious without being oblivious to the structural characteristics of collective political behavior that tends to privilege the self, and
especially the national self, at the expense of the other.”134 Moreover, it
must be an epistemology that is “civilizationally grounded” and inclusive
and that permits a diversity of opinions or interpretations about what is
good not merely for one society, but for all societies.135 In the context of
peacebuilding, this means different paradigms—realism, constructivism,
liberalism—communicating with one another in such a way as to enable the
best insights from each paradigm to be incorporated into a more effective
peacebuilding strategy.
It is worth stating that Falk is not overly idealistic. Throughout his
work, Falk fully acknowledges and expertly communicates the obstacles to
achieving the shift in perspective necessary to achieve an expanded ideal of
citizenship, a commonality of interests; as well as a “collective will to survive,” as a species.136 At the same time, Falk does not lose his sense of
optimism that such a shift will occur, but it must be one that is led by
ordinary people, not elites; the former essential to create a global order “that
is sustainable and satisfying.”137 In a world of “radical uncertainty,” Falk
suggests that it is incumbent upon all of us to “struggle for what we believe
[the world] should be.”138

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Falk, supra note 46.
Falk, supra note 5, at 147.
Id. at 150.
Falk, supra note 132.
Id.
Id.
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